Cooperative Games with Lattice Structure

Faigle, Ulrich and Peis, Britta (2006) Cooperative Games with Lattice Structure.
Technical Report , 21 p.
Submitted

Abstract

A general model for cooperative games with possibly restricted and hierarchically ordered coalitions is introduced and shown to have lattice structure under quite general assumptions. Moreover, the core of games with lattice structure is investigated. Within a general framework that includes the model of classical cooperative games as a special case, it is proved algorithmically that monotone convex games have a non-empty core. Finally, the solution concept of the Shapley value is extended to the general class of cooperative games with restricted cooperation. It is shown that several generalizations of the Shapley value that have been proposed in the literature are subsumed in this model.


Actions:
Download: [img] Postscript - Submitted Version
Download (195Kb) | Preview
Download: [img] PDF - Submitted Version
Download (111Kb) | Preview
Export as:
Editorial actions: View Item View Item (Login required)
Deposit Information:
ZAIK Number: zaik2006-516
Depositing User: Prof. Dr. Ulrich Faigle
Date Deposited: 08 Feb 2006 00:00
Last Modified: 19 Dec 2011 09:44
URI: http://e-archive.informatik.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/516