Cooperative Games with Lattice Structure

Faigle, Ulrich and Peis, Britta (2006) Cooperative Games with Lattice Structure.
Technical Report , 21 p.
Submitted

Abstract

A general model for cooperative games with possibly restricted and hierarchically ordered coalitions is introduced and shown to have lattice structure under quite general assumptions. Moreover, the core of games with lattice structure is investigated. Within a general framework that includes the model of classical cooperative games as a special case, it is proved algorithmically that monotone convex games have a non-empty core. Finally, the solution concept of the Shapley value is extended to the general class of cooperative games with restricted cooperation. It is shown that several generalizations of the Shapley value that have been proposed in the literature are subsumed in this model.


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Content information:
Item Type: Paper (Technical Report)
Citations: 0 (Google Scholar) |
Uncontrolled Keywords: cooperative games core convexity Shapley value
Subjects:
  • 06-XX Order, lattices, ordered algebraic structures > 06Bxx Lattices

  • 91-XX Game theory, economic, social and behavioral sciences > 91Axx Game theory

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    Divisions: Institute of Computer Science > Computer Science Department - Prof. Dr. Schrader
    Mathematical Institute > Prof. Dr. Faigle
    Related URLs:
    Deposit Information:
    ZAIK Number: zaik2006-516
    Depositing User: Prof. Dr. Ulrich Faigle
    Date Deposited: 08 Feb 2006 00:00
    Last Modified: 19 Dec 2011 09:44
    URI: http://e-archive.informatik.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/516